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Executive summary 
The promises and the pitfalls of the new economy 
When the job market began to contract in 2008, it drew the curtains on a recovery 
that had seen strong productivity gains that never translated into adequate income 
growth for most workers. As a result, working families are seeing extraordinary eco-
nomic challenges. In the first half of 2008 alone, the economy has lost over 400,000 
jobs. Unemployment has jumped to 5.5% by mid-2008, up from 4.4% in March 2007, 
pushing an additional 1.8 million persons onto the jobless rolls. This weakness in the 
job market has taken a further toll on already lackluster worker earnings, with most 
paychecks actually losing ground after inflation. 
These recent problems have correctly been linked to a confluence of events. The 
sharp spike in energy costs—up 25% since the middle of last year—is taking a huge bite 
out of family budgets (and at a time when wage growth is weakening). The bursting of 
the housing bubble (see Chapter 5) has undercut home values, shutting down a signifi-
cant source of household wealth. This in turn is fueling millions of defaults on home 
loans, often followed by foreclosure. Spillovers from the housing crisis have wracked 
financial markets and frozen credit markets. In turn, diminished borrowing, including 
home equity lines of credit, is choking off one of the main sources of consumer spending 
growth in the 2000s. 
Yet working Americans are more productive than ever. Putting aside the current 
cyclical downturn, the men and women who routinely keep this country running have 
been working harder and smarter. Since the mid-1990s, the growth of output per hour— 
°r productivity—has undergone a resurgence, and the folks responsible are the 140 
bullion Americans who go to work every day. 
When it comes to efficient, profitable production, the men and women of the 
American workforce have a lot to be proud of. But when it comes to being rewarded for 
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the work they do, the skills they have sharpened, and the contributions they make... 
well, that's a different story. Their paychecks have been frozen, their health coverage 
is being cut back, their jobs are at risk of being shipped overseas, and their pensions 
are more precarious than ever. 
For the first time since the Census Bureau began tracking such data back in the 
mid-1940s, the real incomes of middle-class families are lower at the end of this 
business cycle than they were when it started. This fact stands as the single most 
compelling piece of evidence that prosperity is eluding working families. 
Where has all that productivity growth been going? As this book extensively docu-
ments, it has gone to the top of the income scale, and the higher up you started out, 
the better you did. From 1947 to 1979, the top sliver of wage earners made about 20 
times that of the bottom 90%. By 2006, that ratio had catapulted to 77 times more. 
Now, there are some smart, hard-working, and creative people up there in that 
rarified end of the economic stratosphere, and some deserve large returns for their 
labors. But they cannot possibly be the only ones whose living standards should be 
boosted in a growing economy. Productivity growth is a result of the efforts of the 
whole workforce, not just the fortunate few. Yes, it reflects the work of the CEOs and 
CFOs at the top of the corporate ladder. But it also reflects the work of the waitperson 
who serves those executives their lunch, the construction worker who builds their 
homes, the manufacturer who forges the steel that girds their corporate headquarters, 
the home health aid who cares for their aging parents, the cop who protects their beat, 
and the teacher who educates their kids. 
Earlier editions of this book began to explore this split between the promise of pro-
ductivity growth and the realities of stagnant living standards. But the business cycle 
of the 2000s was ongoing and thus prevented a conclusive evaluation of how these 
dynamics would ultimately play out. After all, the 1990s cycle began with a jobless and 
wageless recovery, too, yet the productivity gains in the latter half of the decade were 
eventually shared. In fact, the late 1990s was the only time of broad-based gains for 
American workers since the early 1970s. 
This edition, however, will be able to examine the full business cycle of the 2000s 
and compare it to earlier cycles. The findings show that the 2000s cycle was one of great 
promise in terms of productivity growth, but the promise of better living standards such 
growth implied was never realized. 
Family income 
Family income is the core building block of American living standards. It is through 
their income that families meet their material needs as well as their aspirations. The 
income that families receive through work, government benefits, or return on invest-
ments enables them to provide for their households, raise their children, and invest 
in their futures. Income not consumed flows into wealth, enabling families to finance 
longer-term investments, like a home, or to offset a period wherein the income flow is 
interrupted. This chapter provides a detailed look into how this key living-standards 
determinant has evolved, both recently and over the long term. 
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The analysis reveals two related points that are central to understanding the evolu-
tion of income growth in America. First, the most recent business cycle the 2000s—was 
unique: despite significant productivity growth in the overall economy, most families 
experienced stagnant or falling real incomes. The American workforce is working 
harder, smarter, and more efficiently, yet failing to share fairly in the benefits of the 
growth they themselves are creating. In fact, with data going back to the mid-1940s, it 
appears that the real income of a typical, middle-income family (i.e., the median) was 
lower at the end of the 2000s cycle than at the beginning. 
That has never happened before. Yes, middle-income families lose ground in a reces-
sion, and lately such losses continue for a number of years after the official recession 
ends. But before the cycle ends—before the next downturn takes hold—real median 
incomes usually start to grow, and ultimately surpass their prior peak. Yet in the 2000s, 
the longest jobless recovery on record hurt families earnings' capacity, while increased 
inequality meant that the growth that did occur bypassed the middle class. 
Second, this sharp rise of income inequality has meant that the link between eco-
nomic growth and broadly shared income gains is broken. The most comprehensive 
data on inequality reveal this stark imbalance. Data on income concentration going 
back to 1913 show that the top 1% of wage earners now hold 23% of total income, 
the highest inequality level in any year on record, bar one: 1928. In the last few years 
alone, $400 billion of pretax income flowed from the bottom 95% of earners to the top 
5%, a loss of $3,660 per household on average in the bottom 95%. 
Note that these inequality developments are all based on market outcomes, or pre-
tax measures. Recent changes to the tax system have exacerbated the problem, by 
lowering the tax liabilities of those at the top of the income scale much more so than 
those in the middle or at the low end. In 2008, the impact of the Bush tax cuts had virtu-
ally no effect on low-income families and lowered the tax liabilities of middle-income 
families by around $1,000. Families in the top 1% of the income scale, conversely, saw 
tax reductions of over $50,000. 
Another important observation woven through Chapter 1 is that there are persistent 
gaps in income between white and African American and Hispanic families. Certainly, 
discrimination plays a role here, as do the lower average levels of educational achieve-
ment among minority populations relative to whites (of course, discrimination is in 
play here too; Chapter 2 adds perspective to these differences by examining educational 
opportunity and income mobility by race). It is also the case that minority families' 
incomes, particularly those of African Americans, tend to be more responsive to overall 
economic trends, both positively and negatively. The downsides of this heightened 
responsiveness are worrisome, particularly given the current economic downturn. But 
1
 is critically important for living standards analysts interested in racial differences 
o also remain mindful of the upside of this relationship: full employment provides a 
strong boost to minority incomes. We stress this point both in historical terms and with 
reference to the most recent period of full employment: the latter 1990s. In those years, 
e
 pace of minority families' income growth surpassed that of white families, (average 
annual income growth from 1995-2000 was 2.9% for black families and 2.1 % for white 
m
 ies) and the racial income gap shrunk to historically low levels. In the ensuing 
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downturn and weaker 2000s recovery, much of this valuable ground has been lost (with 
average annual income growth from 2000-06 at -0.2% for white families and -0.5% for 
black families). 
Amidst the troubling results of the labor market of the 2000s, it is important to 
scan the historical record for periods where living standards outcomes were much 
different. In fact, there are a few periods over both the distant and recent past when 
family incomes were distributed much more equally, leading to living standards im-
provements across the board, not just at the top. There is one characteristic—alluded 
to in the above discussion on minority incomes—that these periods shared, whether it 
was the 1950s or the latter 1990s: very tight labor markets. Full employment, where 
the unemployment rate is low enough such that employers must share the benefits of 
growth in order to get and keep the workforce they need, is absolutely a necessary 
condition for reconnecting the overall economy and with the income of the working 
families that propel it forward. 
Income-class mobility 
Chapter 2 documents the historically large increase in income inequality in recent 
years, reaching levels of concentration not seen since the latter 1920s. Such analysis 
essentially takes a snapshot of the distribution of family income at one point in time 
and compares it to another of different families, years later. As the chapter reveals, these 
pictures present important information about the extent of economic inequality at two 
points in time. But they say nothing about how individuals themselves have fared over 
their own lifetimes. For that, one must switch from "snapshots" to "movies." That is the 
purpose of the Income-class Mobility chapter. 
What do we learn from this "movie" approach compared to the snapshots of the 
previous chapter? If the data were to show, for example, that many families were likely to 
move from the bottom fifth of the income distribution to the top over time, or that children 
of wealthy families might switch places with middle-class kids when they became adults, 
then one could conclude that the benefits of growth were more broadly shared than 
suggested by the profound inequality displayed in the snapshots of Chapter 1. 
The evidence, however, does not find this degree of mobility. Of course, some 
families do move up and down the income scales, but most maintain their relative posi-
tions, meaning that relative to other families in their cohort, they remain at or near the 
income or wealth position in which they started out. For example, one recent study finds 
that about 60% of families that start in the bottom fifth are still there a decade later. At 
the other end of the income scale, 52% of families that start in the top fifth finish there 
at the end of the decade. 
Given its dynamic component, mobility can be a more ambiguous concept than 
others explored thus far. Simply put, Chapter 2 examines the extent to which your 
economic position today determines your position tomorrow. If where you start out 
in the income scale has a strong influence on where you end up, then the rate of eco-
nomic mobility is low. If, on the other hand, where you start out is largely unrelated to 
where you end up, mobility is high. In fact, Chapter 2 reports significant correlations 
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between parents and their children, implying that income mobility is at least some-
what restricted as one generation's position in the income scale is partially dependent 
on their parents' position. For example, one recent study finds the correlation between 
parents and children to be 0.6 (Mazumder 2005). This finding is significant because 
it implies that it would take a poor family of four with two children approximately 
nine to 10 generations—over 200 years—to achieve the income of the middle-income 
four-person family. 
In other words, the extent of income mobility across generations plays a determi-
nant role in the living standards of American families, It is, for example, a key determi-
nant of how many generations a family will be stuck at the low end of the income scale, 
or snugly ensconced at the high end. American folklore often emphasizes the rags-to-
riches Horatio Alger stories, which suggest that anyone with the gumption and smarts 
to prevail can lift themselves up by their bootstraps and transverse the income scale in 
a generation. Reality, however, shows much less mobility. 
Still, popular wisdom would suggest that there is probably more mobility in 
America compared with the advanced economies in Europe or Scandinavia. Shouldn't 
their more-extensive social protections and less-freewheeling approach to economic 
policy dampen the entrepreneurial spark that gives birth to the American rags-to-
riches paradigm? To the contrary: one of the most surprising findings of this research 
is that the opposite is true. Parents' economic positions in these countries are less 
correlated with their children's later income, meaning there is more intergenerational 
mobility there than in the United States. 
What explains this lack of mobility? Certainly unequal education opportunities and 
historical discrimination play a role. For example, there are very steep mobility barriers 
facing African Americans, both in their own chances of moving up, and especially when 
compared to whites. One study shows that almost two-thirds (63%) of black children who 
start out in the bottom fourth of the income scale remain there as adults, compared to half 
that share for white children. Another deeply disturbing study finds that 45% of African 
American children who start out in middle-income families experience significant down-
ward mobility, ending up in poor families (in the bottom fifth of the income scale) as 
adults, compared to 16% for whites. 
In fact, opportunity itself appears to be unequally distributed, leading to one of 
the central conclusion of Chapter 2, one that ties the findings of this chapter to those 
of Chapter 1. It is often said that Americans do not object to unequal outcomes, only 
to unequal opportunities. But what if unequal outcomes themselves lead to diminished 
opportunities? If growth flows mostly to those at the top of scale (higher inequality), 
" is possible that children from these fortunate households will have greater access 
to quality education relative to children from less well-placed families. If inequality 
means that some neighborhoods get parks and libraries while others do not, this too 
restricts opportunity. If quality health care is more accessible to the haves than the 
ave-nots, the latter face a mobility barrier born of inequality. 
If income concentration leads to a level of political influence that tilts against the 
-nots, this too will reduce opportunity and ultimately lower the rate of economic 
1
 ¥' **> f° r example, as has occurred in recent federal budgets, opportunity 
:v--/. 
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enhancing programs for disadvantaged children, like Head Start or subsidized health 
care (State Children's Health Insurance Program), are cut in order to maintain high-
end tax cuts, the likelihood that economically disadvantaged children will experience 
significant mobility is diminished. 
While these connections are logical, at this point, research has not generally iden-
tified the determinants of mobility in this or other countries. One important excep-
tion, however, is higher education. Here, the data do show that children from wealthy 
families have much greater access to top-tier universities than kids from low-income 
families, even when controlling for innate skills. 
This educational barrier places profound limits on income mobility. Of those adults 
who grew up in low-income families but managed to earn a college degree, only 16% 
ended up in the bottom fifth of the income scale as adults. But for those who failed to 
graduate college, the share that started out and ended up in the bottom fifth was 45%. 
In other words, among children who grew up in low-income families, those who failed 
to graduate college were almost three times more likely to still be in the bottom fifth as 
adults compared to children who completed college. 
Wages 
Because wages and salaries make up roughly three-fourths of total family income (the 
proportion is even higher among the broad middle class), wage trends are the driving 
force behind income growth and income inequality trends. Chapter 3 examines and 
explains the trends in wage growth and wage inequality during the last few decades up 
through 2007, with a particular focus on the business cycle from 2000 to 2007. 
The major development in the labor market in recent years has been the stunning 
disconnect between the possibilities for improved pay provided by rapid productivity 
growth and the reality of stunted paychecks, especially in the recent recovery. Produc-
tivity grew 11% in the recovery, a faster growth than any recovery since the 1970s. Yet, 
hourly compensation for the median worker (either the overall median, or of workers 
with either a high school or college degree) did not grow at all in the recovery despite 
historically high productivity growth. 
The wage momentum from the late 1990s into the 2000s is important to understand 
when looking at trends over the just completed business cycle, the 2000-07 period; all 
of the wage growth in the 2000-07 cycle occurred within the first two years. The poor 
job creation and increased job shortages during the early 2000s recession and lackluster 
recovery eventually knocked wage growth down so that prices rose at least as fast. This 
was the case even in 2007, when the unemployment rate was at 4.6%. Since 2000, wage 
growth among the bottom 70% has been modest at 3.0% or less; at the median, growth 
of 2.6% over the 2000-07 period was just one-third that of the 1995-2000 period. Wage 
growth among higher-wage workers was also slower in recent years than in the 
1995-2000 period. Wage deceleration, then, has been pervasive. 
Digging a little deeper into these trends, we find that women are much more likely 
to earn poverty-level wages than men. In 2007, 31.4% of women earned poverty-
level wages or less, significantly more than the share of men (21.8%). The proportion 
of minority worke 
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of minority workers earning low wages is substantial—34.0% of black workers and 
41.8% of Hispanic workers in 2007. Overall, 26.4% of workers, over one in every 
four, earned poverty-level wages in 2007. There was momentum in reducing poverty-
wage jobs in the late 1990s that continued until 2002 and then dissipated. There has 
been no progress in reducing the share of workers with low earnings over the 2002-07 
recovery; this is true for all race/ethnic groups and for both genders. 
There are three key elements of wage inequality. One is the "bottom half gap be-
tween middle-wage (median-wage earners) and low-wage workers. Another is the "top 
half gap between high-wage (90th or 95th percentile wage earners) and middle-wage 
earners. The third element is the gap at the very top, that is, the growth of wages for 
those in the upper 1% and even the upper 0.1%, including chief executive officers 
(CEOs). These three elements have had differing historical trajectories. The gap at the 
bottom grew in the 1980s but has been stable or declining ever since, whereas the "top 
half wage gap has persistently grown since the late 1970s. The very highest earners 
have done considerably better than other workers for at least 30 years, but they have 
done extraordinarily well over the last 10 years. 
Explaining these shifts in wage inequality requires attention to several factors that 
affect low-, middle-, and high-wage workers differently. The experience of the late 
1990s is a reminder of the great extent to which a low unemployment rate benefits 
workers, especially low-wage earners. Correspondingly, the high levels of unemploy-
ment in the early and mid-1980s and in recent years disempowered wage earners and 
provided the context in which other forces—specifically, a weakening of labor market 
institutions and globalization—could drive up wage inequality. Significant shifts in 
labor market policies and institutions, such as the severe drop in the minimum wage 
and deunionization, can explain one-third of growing wage inequality. Similarly, the in-
creasing globalization of the economy—immigration, trade, and capital mobility—and 
the employment shift toward lower-paying service industries (such as retail trade) and 
away from manufacturing can explain, in combination, at least another third of the total 
growth in wage inequality. Macroeconomic factors also played an important role: high 
unemployment in the early 1980s greatly increased wage inequality, the low unemploy-
ment of the late 1990s reduced it, and the slack labor market of the 2000s has fueled 
further inequalities. 
The shape of wage inequality shifted in the late 1980s as the gap at the bottom— 
that is, the 50/10 gap between middle-wage workers at the 50th percentile and low-wage 
workers at the 10th—began to shrink. However, over the last few years, this progress 
against wage inequality at the bottom has been growing among both men and women. 
This reversal is partially the effect of the jobless recovery and the still-remaining short-
age of jobs and partially a result of the continued drop in the real value of the mini-
mum wage, at least until 2007. The greatest increase in wage inequality at the bottom 
occurred among women and corresponded to the fall in the minimum wage over the 
1980s, the high unemployment of the early 1980s, and the expansion of low-wage retail 
jo s. The positive trend in this wage gap over the 1990s owes much to increases in the 
- ™
m um wage, low unemployment, and the slight, relative contraction in low-paying 
retail jobs in the late 1990s. The wage gap at the top half—the 90/50 or 95/50 gap 
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between high- and middle-wage earners—continued its steady growth in the 1990s and 
the 2000s (except the last few years) but at a slightly slower pace than in the 1980s. 
The continuing influence of globalization, deunionization, and the shift to lower-paying 
service industries ("industry shifts") can explain the continued growth of wage inequality 
in the top half 
The top 1% of earners in 2006 had average annual earnings of $576,000 (in 2007 
dollars). The top earners' share of earnings was relatively stable from 1947 into the 
1970s but nearly doubled from 7.3% in 1979 to 13.6% in 2006 (the latest year of avail-
able data). This is the consequence of earnings growth of 144.4% from 1979 to 2006 
for the top 1% compared with just 15.6% for the bottom 90%. Those in the upper 0.1% 
of earners (the top one-thousandth) fared far better, seeing their annual earnings grow 
324% since 1979 to reach over $2.2 million in 2006. Consequently, the earnings of the 
top 0.1 % grew to be 77 times the earnings of the bottom 90% in 2006 whereas they 
were just 21 times as much in 1979. 
The erosion of the extent and quality of employer-provided benefits, most notably 
pensions and health insurance, is an important aspect of the deterioration in job quality 
for many workers. Employer-provided health care coverage eroded from 1979 until 
1993-94, when it stabilized, and then began falling again after 2000 through 2006 
(the latest data): coverage dropped from 69.0% in 1979 to 55.0% in 2006, with a 3.9 
percentage-point fall since 2000. Employer-provided pension coverage tended to rise 
in the 1990s but receded by 2.8 percentage points from 2000 to 2006 to 42.8%, 7.8 
percentage points below the level in 1979. Pension plan quality also receded as the 
share of workers in defmed-benefit plans fell from 39% in 1980 to just 18% in 2004. 
Correspondingly, the share of workers with a defined-contribution plan (and no other 
plan) rose from 8% to 31%. 
Young workers' prospects are a barometer of the strength of the labor market: 
when the labor market is strong for workers the prospects for young workers are very 
strong, and when the labor market is weak their prospects are very weak. Wages were 
stagnant or fell among every entry-level group, both high school and college-educated 
workers and both men and women in the period of sluggish wage growth since 2000. 
For instance, the entry-level hourly wage of a young male high school graduate in 
2007 was 18.2% less than that for the equivalent worker in 1979, a drop of $2.62 per 
hour. Among women, the entry-level high school wage fell 11.2% in this period, with a 
6.3% loss since 2000 standing out. Entry-level wages fell among both female and male 
college graduates from 2000 to 2007, 3.2% among men and 1.7% among women. This 
contrasts to the extremely strong wage growth for each of these groups from 1995 to 
2000, when wages rose roughly 10% for entry-level high school men and women and 
20.9% for entry-level college men, 11.7% for college women. 
Unionized workers earn higher wages than comparable non-union workers and 
also are 18.3%) more likely to have health insurance, 22.5% more likely to have pen-
sion coverage, and 3.2% more likely to have paid leave. The erosion of unioniza-
tion (from 43.1% in 1978 to just 19.2% in 2005) can account for 65% of the 11.1 
percentage-point growth of the blue-collar/white-collar wage gap among men over 
the 1978-2005 period. 
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Until it was raised in 2007, the real value of the minimum wage fell steadily in real 
terms from 2000, thereby causing the earnings of low-wage workers to seriously fall be-
hind those of other workers and contributing to rising wage inequality in this period. The 
legislated increases in the minimum wage through 2009 benefits workers who make im-
portant contributions to their family's economic well-being: over half of those benefiting 
from the current increases in the minimum wage work full-time and another 31% work 
more than 20 hours weekly. While minorities are disproportionately represented among 
minimum wage workers, 61% are white. These workers also tend to be women (59% of 
the total) and concentrated in the retail and hospitality industries (46% of all minimum 
wage earners are employed there, compared to just 21% of all workers). 
The 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s have been prosperous times for top U.S. executives, 
especially relative to other wage earners. Over the 1989 to 2007 period, the median 
CEO saw pay rise by 106.8%, and the average CEO pay rose 1673%. During that same 
period a typical worker's wage grew by just 10%, and mostly in the late 1990s. In 1965, 
U.S. CEOs in major companies earned 24 times more than an average worker; this ratio 
grew to 298 at the end of the recovery in 2000, fell due to the stock market decline in 
the early 2000s and recovered to 275 in 2007. In other words, in 2007 a CEO earned 
more in one workday (there are 260 in a year) than the typical worker earned all year. 
Finally, an analysis of employment projections shows that jobs of the future will 
require greater education credentials, but not to any great extent. In 2006 the occupa-
tional composition of jobs required that 27.7% of the workforce have a college degree 
or more. This share will rise by just 1 percentage point, to 28.7%, by 2016. 
Jobs 
The job market is the primary mechanism through which the county's economic 
growth reaches working families. So following a recession, a robust job market—one 
with enough job creation to fully utilize the labor force's workers and their skills—is 
a critical component of a strong, lasting, and equitable recovery. By that measure, the 
recovery following the recession of 2001 fell short. 
The recession of 2001 was followed by nearly two years of continued job loss, 
and it took an unprecedented four years to re-attain the number of jobs the economy 
supported prior to the recession. The first few years of the recovery of the 2000s 
have been aptly coined the "jobless" recovery—meaning that the recession of 2001 
was officially over, but the economy was still not generating job growth. Looking 
over the whole cycle, from 2000 to 2007, average annual job growth was 0.6%, well 
below the 1.8% annual job growth of the 1990s cycle. This historically weak job 
creation was costly for working families. The resulting lower rates of employment 
and consequent lack of upward pressure on wages translated into lost output and 
orgone increases in living standards. Poor job growth is one of the important factors 
eriying the ongoing divergence of overall economic growth and the wages and 
income of working families shown in earlier chapters. 
In addition to weak job creation, the business cycle of the 2000s was lackluster by other 
vant employment indicators. The unemployment rate increased by 0.7 percentage points 
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from March 2001 (the peak of the last business cycle) to December 2007, despite the fact 
that the average age of workers increased and the labor force participation rate shrank—both 
of which should have put downward pressure on the rate of unemployment. Furthermore, 
if unemployed, a worker's likelihood of being unemployed long-term grew dramatically. 
In 2000,11.4% of the unemployed had been so for more than six months, but in 2007, that 
number was 17.5%. Underemployment also grew particularly quickly—from 7.0% in 2000 
to 8.3% in 2007—with, for example, a significantly higher percentage of workers working 
"involuntarily" part time in 2007 than in 2000. 
The employment rate was also disappointing—it decreased by 1.5 percentage 
points over the 2000s cycle, in contrast to the 2.6 percentage-point average increase 
over prior cycles. The departure from previous cycles was especially dramatic for women, 
who saw their employment rates decrease by 1.8 percentage points after decades of 
dramatic increases. The one group that saw significant gains in employment over this 
period were workers aged 55 and over, as older workers were more likely to need to 
work to cover health care costs and to bolster retirement income. 
Employment is the foundation of family income and economic well-being. The great 
American jobs machine is arguably the most powerful mechanism in the economy for 
achieving broadly shared prosperity. But the faltering of that machine in the 2000s, as it 
produced the weakest jobs recovery on record, has left lingering adversity for workers and 
their families. When jobs are plentiful, not only are workers more likely to find employ-
ment that matches their skills and experience, they are also in a better position to search 
for higher-paid employment and are in a better bargaining position with respect to their 
employer to ask for higher levels of compensation. Job growth, however, was too tepid 
over the business cycle of the 2000s to boost living standards for most workers—even as 
the economy expanded and labor productivity posted impressive gains. 
In other words, for most working families, the "recovery" of the 2000s felt like 
anything but. And by virtually all measures, the recovery has ended, and the economy 
is now heading into a potentially severe economic downturn. Without the cushion that 
a robust jobs expansion may have afforded them, many families are now facing a sub-
stantial threat to their living standards. 
Wealth 
Like wages and income, wealth has a crucial effect on a family's standard of living. 
Wealth—particularly liquid assets such as checking account balances, stocks, and 
bonds—can help families cope with financial emergencies related to unemployment 
or illness. Wealth also makes it easier for families to invest in education and training, 
start a small business, or fund retirement. More tangible forms of wealth, such as cars, 
computers, and homes, can directly affect a family's ability to participate fully in work, 
school, and community life. Chapter 2 touches on the fact that in the United States there 
is a high degree of correlation in wealth across generations—children of poor parents 
are much more likely to be poor, and children of wealthy parents are much more likely 
to be wealthy—pointing to the existence of class barriers that violate a core American 
principal of equal opportunity for all. 
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Chapter 5 further investigates wealth in America, uncovering some important fea-
tures. First, wealth distribution is highly unequal—much more so than the distribution 
of wages and income that are the focus of other chapters. In 2004 (the most recent data 
available), the wealthiest 1% of all households controlled a larger share of national 
wealth than the entire bottom 90%. Average wealth held by the top 1 % was close to $ 15 
million, while it was $81,000 for households in the middle fifth of the wealth distribu-
tion. The ownership of stocks is particularly unequal, with most Americans having no 
meaningful stake in the stock market. 
Moreover, wealth has become more concentrated at the top over time. Over the 
1962-2004 period, the share of wealth held by the bottom 80% of the wealth distribu-
tion fell from 19.1%—already an extremely small share—to 15.3%. The decline in 
wealth share being held by the bottom 80% shifted to the wealthiest 5% over this period. 
As the wealthiest continue to thrive, many households are left behind with little 
or nothing in the way of assets, and often with significant debt. Approximately 30% 
of households have a net worth of less than $10,000, and approximately one in six 
households have zero or negative net wealth. Furthennore, only households at the top 
of the income distribution are likely to be adequately prepared for retirement. For over 
a quarter of American households, income from Social Security, pensions, and personal 
savings are expected to replace less than half of their pre-retirement income. 
That wealth differs considerably by race is another important observation of this 
analysis. Median wealth of white households is 10 times that of black households. 
Home ownership rates also vary considerably by race—less than half of black and 
Hispanic household own their homes, whereas almost three-quarters of white house-
holds do. Many more black households than white households (29.4% vs. 13.0%) 
have zero or negative net wealth. 
Finally, for the typical household, debt has grown much faster than income in the 
last decade, fueled by increases in mortgages and home equity loans. In 2007, debt was 
over 140% of disposable personal income. As housing prices collapse, the associated 
loss of home equity combined with large debt burdens are endangering the economic 
security of many Americans. Furthermore, for the vast majority of homeowners, home 
equity is the main source of wealth. For many homeowners approaching retirement, a 
decline in home equity means the loss of retirement security. The extent of the effects of 
the bursting of the housing bubble on wealth levels of the typical homeowner remains 
to be seen, but high average debt levels along with plunging home prices suggest that 
the damage will be severe and long lasting. 
Poverty 
While other chapters discuss income, wealth, and mobility trends affecting families of 
income classes, Chapter 6 focuses exclusively on families with low incomes. 
I he first challenge in this analysis is definitional. Dividing lines between income 
^oups are, of course, somewhat arbitrary, and there are many ways to define "low 
e
* Fhe most common definition in American income analysis uses the official 
verty lme of the U.S. government. While there is some value to this measure—it is 
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consistent over time, and many useful time series employ the official measure—-it is 
widely considered to be an inadequate measure of the concept of poverty. 
The concept of poverty, or inadequate income to meet the basic needs given societal 
norms, involves two basic measurement challenges: defining income and defining the 
threshold below which families are judged to be poor. Chapter 6 presents measures 
using various alternative definitions of both income and poverty thresholds. For 
example, some of the evidence Chapter 6 tracks uses twice the official poverty line as 
a threshold. While this measure will lead to higher shares of low-income persons com-
pared to the official measure, evidence on basic-needs family budgets suggests it is a 
much more realistic measure of material well-being. 
Chapter 6 also presents measures that adjust income in common sense ways. For 
example, the official measure ignores the value of food stamps, a near-cash benefit 
received by some low-income families. Some of the analysis below corrects that, adding 
the cash value of this benefit back into income. Better measures also subtract taxes paid 
and add tax credits, since poverty is best understood as a post-tax measure (because 
families provide for themselves with post-tax income). 
Analyzing both the official series, enhanced by a broad set of better, alternative 
measures, establishes a number of revealing facts about poverty in America: 
Under the official poverty measure, 12.3% of the population, over 36 million 
people (including 12.8 million children), were poor in 2006. But under an updated, 
comprehensive measure that corrects the shortcomings of the official measure, 
many millions more people would be classified as poor. In 2006, the poverty rate 
was 17.7%, compared to 12.3% under the official measure. That is an extra 16 
million poor persons, compared to the official undercount. 
• Under either an official or more accurate alternative measure, a larger share of the 
population was poor or low-income in 2006 than in 2000, despite the economic 
recovery that occurred over those years. While the 2000s business cycle was not 
the first in which poverty increased (poverty rose over the 1980s cycle, too), the 
increase is especially problematic because it occurred despite significantly faster 
productivity growth than in earlier periods. 
An analysis of the factors responsible for the increase in poverty in the 2000s 
suggests that greater inequality of income explains almost all of the full percent-
age-point increase. 
The backsliding against poverty in the 2000s is most notable among the least 
advantaged, who happened to be the same groups that made the most progress in 
the 1990s. One particularly disheartening example is young (less than six years 
old) African American children. Almost half were officially poor in 1995, going 
down to one-third in 2000. That share has since climbed back up to 38.4%. 
Similarly, the poverty of mother-only families increased significantly over the 2000s. 
Evidence regarding their incomes and work in the paid labor market suggests that 
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the anti-poverty safety net in the United States has been less counter-cyclical, that is, 
less effective in reducing economic hardship when the economy and job market are 
underperforming. 
• As low-income policy has come to depend more on paid work as the main pathway 
out of poverty, the quality of jobs in the low-wage labor market, along with work-
supports (public benefits tied to work), have become more important determinants 
of poverty outcomes. The fact that one-fourth of the labor force earns low wages 
by one widely used measure thus poses a binding constraint on progress against 
low incomes. 
Health 
Much of this book focuses on wages, income, and wealth across the population. Chapter 7, 
however, examines another important measure of workers' living standards—health care, 
particularly employer-provided health insurance, life expectancy, and health care costs. 
Vast improvements have been made in health insurance coverage and health status 
over the last half century. Living standards are better in general, and Americans have 
the advantage of a more-extensive and far-reaching health care system than ever be-
fore. These improvements, though true on average, do not reflect the inequality in 
the U.S. health care system. While Americans, on average, are healthier and living 
longer, many are left without adequate insurance coverage or access to the great 
advances of our health care system. Nowhere are these disparities clearer than in life 
expectancies, where the gap between the socioeconomically best- and worst-off grew 
from 2.8 years in 1980 to 4.5 years in 2000. 
Chapter 7 begins with trends in employer-provided health insurance over the 2000s. 
Since the previous peak, the findings indicate losses in this valuable benefit (down 5.4 
percentage points), particularly among the less educated and lower income. Children 
experienced the greatest declines in employer-provided coverage (down 6.5 percentage 
points), although they have the greatest advantage of the public health insurance safety 
net, which has kept many of them from becoming uninsured. 
The data suggest growing disparities in access to insurance, health security, and 
health outcomes by income, race, and education. Other chapters demonstrate the great 
divide between those at the top of the income distribution and those in the middle 
and at the bottom. Here, we reveal how those inequalities play out in the health care 
landscape. While average life span in the United States has grown, much of the in-
crease is due to large gains at the top and minimal gains at the bottom. Disparities also 
remain by race: the infant mortality rate of blacks is 2.3 times higher than whites. 
One area that affects everyone in the United States is rising health costs. The 
o s
 s to employers and workers of purchasing healthcare coverage and services are 
growing much faster than overall inflation and wages. Premiums increased 115% 
om 1999 to 2007 as compared to 29% and 24% increases in workers' earnings and 
"Vo V ' r e S^ e C^V e^' -^ s n lg expenses are shown to incur an increasing burden on 
r
 g families even for those lucky enough to have insurance on the job. 
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Chapter 7 concludes with a comparison of health care in the United States with that 
in several peer countries. While the United States is the only one of its peers without 
universal health insurance, it spends by far the highest percentage of its GDP on health 
care. Furthermore, the high spending in the United States does not produce better 
overall health outcomes relative to other developed countries—for example, the United 
States has the lowest life expectancy and the highest infant mortality rates of its peers. 
International comparisons 
Preceding chapters examine current U.S. economic outcomes using historical U.S. 
outcomes as a benchmark. Chapter 8 compares U.S. economic performance to 19 other 
industrialized countries belonging to the Paris-based Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). These countries are the global peers of the 
United States—economies facing the same global conditions with respect to trade, 
investment, technology, the environment, and other factors that shape economic op-
portunities. The comparison thus provides an independent yardstick for gauging the 
strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. economy. It also sheds light on the advisability 
of exporting the "U.S. model" to other economies—specifically, features of the U.S. 
economy such as weaker unions, lower minimum wages, less-generous social benefits, 
and lower taxes—as a strategy for addressing the economic problems, real or perceived, 
among its global peers. 
Two dominant themes emerge from Chapter 8. First, while the United States is 
a very rich country—currently second only to Norway in per capita income—much 
less of the vast income of the United States is reaching the lower end of the income 
distribution. The United States has the highest level of inequality of its peers, whether 
measured in terms of Gini coefficients or the ratio of earnings of high earners (90th 
percentile) to low earners (10th percentile). The United States also has the highest 
rate of poverty among its peers, including child poverty—with a child poverty rate 
over twice as high as the average of the comparison countries. While it is true that 
many families in the United States are well-off, a great many are not, especially when 
compared to low- and moderate-income families in other advanced countries. 
Second, it is far from a foregone conclusion that economies that have strong wel-
fare states and labor protections are also necessarily less productive, less employment-
generating, and less "flexible" than the U.S. economy. Many peer countries with strong 
unions, high minimum wages, generous social benefits, and high taxes have caught up 
with, and in many cases surpassed, U.S. productivity while achieving low unemploy-
ment levels. Both Norway and the Netherlands, for example, have higher productivity 
than the United States and lower unemployment rates. It is an important point that 
so many peer countries have been successful and productive within very different 
economic models. 
Other important insights in Chapter 8: 
The employment rate in the United States was the 10th highest (out of 20 countries). 
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A breakdown of per capita income shows that, while U.S. productivity is an im-
portant determinant of its high per capita income, an equally significant factor is that 
Americans simply work more annual hours. 
Vacation time is mandated in every other peer country, whereas there is no 
mandated vacation time in the United States. On average, full-time employees 
in the United States work over four weeks more per year than full-time workers 
in peer countries. 
Conclusion 
In the popular media, economic experts will endlessly debate the dynamics and causes 
of the current downturn. They will parse the minutia of the data, with some claiming 
the worst is over while others argue it is yet to come. Sadly, most of these debates 
will likely have very little to do with the real economic challenges facing working 
families today. 
The men and women of the American workforce have worked harder and smarter 
to make the United States a world-class economy. In particular, when considering the 
2000s, the U.S. workforce has chalked up some of the most impressive productivity 
growth rates in decades. And the mantra among economists and policy makers is that, 
as grows productivity, so shall living standards improve. 
Would it were so. The results highlighted in this volume regarding the income of 
middle-class families, the poverty of low-income families, and the historically off-the-
charts measures of inequality tell a very different story. That is, they describe a dif-
ferent story. The story behind these unsettling trends—the chain of events and policy 
changes that brought them about—is more complex than the tale told by a few tables 
and graphs. 
That story has to do with the diminished bargaining power of the American worker. 
Not simply the story of the factory workers facing competition from cheap imports. Not 
simply that of the disempowered worker trying to form a union while facing stiff political 
opposition from above, nor simply the tale of the minimum wage worker facing a sinking 
real wage floor. 
The diminished ability of American workers to claim their fair share of the 
economy's growth—growth they themselves are creating—includes all of these stories 
and much more. 
The full explanation would also encompass the gifted child whose family's income 
constraints bar her from any college, much less a top tier one. It includes the willing 
workers who couldn't find a good job during the expansion and can't find one at all in 
e ownturn. It includes college graduates whose work can now be digitized and sent 
o shore. It includes workers throughout the pay scale absorbing evermore of the costs 
an risks of their pension and health care coverage, risks that used to be carried by the 
employer. 
. . O ^ e l ^ d t h e s e Ganges lies the rise of YOYO economics, the "You're-on-Your-
pnilosophy that has guided economic policy makers for too long. The YOYOs 
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are market fundamentalists. They believe that unfettered market outcomes are always 
the best outcomes, and to nudge the invisible hand is to invite doom (unless you're 
nudging it toward your well-endowed friends). The YOYOs want to replace Social 
Security with private retirement accounts, kill the minimum wage, weaken unions, and 
force everyone to buy health insurance in the individual market. Anything else, they 
argue, will create the "wrong incentives." 
As this book goes to press, we are in a unique position to judge the efficacy of an 
economic model based on reduced worker bargaining power and YOYO economics. 
Recent years have provided something rare in economics: a natural experiment. The 
past few decades, and especially the past few years, reveal the impact of this approach 
on the living standards of working families. The results are unequivocal: families are 
ill-served by this set of policies. For the first time in the history of the data going back 
to 1947, middle-income families were left no better off at the end of this business cycle 
in 2007 than they were in 2000. Similarly, a smaller share of the adult population was 
working at the end of this cycle than at the beginning. Despite the YOYO's label of 
"ownership society" for their set of policies, home-ownership rates are falling, along 
with net worth. And after making historically rapid progress against minority poverty 
in the latter 1990s, poverty rates are higher now than in 2000, especially for the least-
advantaged among us. 
The macro-economy is in serious disrepair, beset by the spillovers from the 
bursting of a massive housing bubble, high energy prices, and unsustainable levels of 
household indebtedness. Policy makers are doing some things to stem the damage— 
rebate checks for households and massive, federally administered liquidity injections 
to the financial markets (revealingly, the YOYOs turn to government quite aggres-
sively when their backs are against the wall). But unless these policy makers change 
the underlying notions that have guided their policy making (or lack thereof), these 
will all be temporary patches. 
The State of Working America series has never been a policy manifesto. Elsewhere, 
we and others have worked to craft the set of ideas designed to reconnect growth and 
broadly shared prosperity (see the Economic Policy Institute's Agenda for Shared Pros-
perity for the results of such efforts). But, if we have succeeded in our purpose, this 
book will stand as a powerful motivator for the type of change we believe these new 
policies will engender. 
The hundreds of graphs and tables that follow paint a portrait of working America. 
Some sections of the portrait are bright and optimistic, documenting the prodigious 
efforts of the men and women who keep the biggest and richest economy in the world 
moving forward. But other sections are less hopeful, as too few of those worker's con-
tributions are fairly rewarded. Some sections even show despairing families, left behind 
in ways that will painfully reverberate for generations. 
We present the whole of the portrait—The State of Working America 2008-2009— 
to you in the pages that follow. We hope it informs, motivates, and inspires you to press 
for an economy that works best, not for a select few, but for all of us. 
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